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The Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise at the University of Maryland’s School of 
Public Policy provides the strategic linkage between the public and private sector to develop and 
improve solutions to increasingly complex problems associated with the delivery of public 
services—a responsibility increasingly shared by both sectors. Operating at the nexus of public 
and private interests, the Center researches, develops, and promotes best practices; develops 
policy recommendations; and strives to influence senior decision-makers toward improved 
government and industry results.  
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National budgetary challenges will continue to exert downward pressure on the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD’s) budgets. In the past, the DoD relied on personnel reductions in order to 
constrain costs. Today, however, the active military force structure is already near an all-time 
low, meaning that significant reductions are unlikely. At the same time, the challenges to the 
nation’s security continue to grow. Consequently, the DoD must strive to develop an acquisition 
strategy that is not only affordable, but also provides the quality and quantity of forces required.  
The current metrics that are used to evaluate DoD programs do not provide decision-makers with 
timely, consistent, reliable, or useful data in that they rely on lagging indicators (i.e., they 
provide information about past performance). In an effort to better control costs, schedule, and 
product quality, the DoD should develop and adopt effective “leading indicators”—reliable and 
predictive metrics that provide earlier warnings of programmatic problems and challenges. The 
successful use of leading indicators could provide program managers, the DoD, and Congress 
with earlier warnings of program difficulty.  
While previous initiatives implemented by the DoD rely on lagging indicators, there are others 
that purport to make use of leading indicators. These initiatives are described below.  
Prior to 1968, the DoD had no system for monitoring the progress of major systems (Hough, 
1992). In order to facilitate internal cost control, the DoD introduced Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs), which summarized the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and performance. Soon 
thereafter, SARs were submitted to Congress on a regular basis. SARs have served as the 
primary source of research into cost growth for decades. Unfortunately, however, SAR data 
cannot be used to identify a program’s cost drivers. This is because the reports classify cost 
growth using variance categories that show only the effects of secondary factors (Hough, 1992).  
Another initiative, the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment (NM), enacted by Congress in 1982 and 
modified in 2006 and 2009, requires the DoD to notify Congress when the unit cost growth of 
any major defense acquisition program is expected to exceed certain cost growth thresholds. 
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Unfortunately, defense acquisition projects continue to experience high unit cost growth in spite 
of NM cost breeches. Acquisition problems are uncovered too late in the development process to 
allow program reforms to be effective. A 2011 RAND report identified common root causes of 
Nunn-McCurdy breaches, including the use of immature technologies, unanticipated integration 
issues, unstable funding, ambitious scheduling, and ill-conceived manufacturing processes and 
insufficient research, development, testing, and engineering (RDT&E). Needless to say, 
problems of this nature—after they have been observed on a program—cannot simply be 
corrected in order to bring costs back within initial expectations. 
A third initiative, cost as an independent variable (CAIV), which was developed in the 1990s, 
strives to elevate the importance of cost within the trade space. All acquisitions are assessed 
based on their cost, schedule, and performance. Collectively, these three parameters make up the 
trade space. CAIV attempted to create a cost-saving environment by emphasizing the importance 
of cost over performance and schedule. However, it does not appear that the use of the CAIV 
approach has achieved the desired results. In the early 1990s, the DoD selected eight programs to 
serve as CAIV flagships. These programs, it was believed, would demonstrate how this initiative 
could contain costs. In 1999, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified program 
offices that were “leaders” in the application of various acquisition best practices, one of which 
was the CAIV approach (GAO, 1999a, p. 22). Yet none of the programs stayed below the initial 
estimated cost. Minimizing restrictions within the trade space by treating cost as an independent 
variable, is a good first step. However, in practice, it appears that this approach did not go far 
enough.   
In the 1960s, the DoD developed earned value management (EVM) to serve as a leading 
indicator of program performance. In June 2002, the Office of Management and Budget 
mandated the use of EVM systems for all major information technology (IT) service and 
acquisition contracts. EVM measures the value of work accomplished in a given period and 
compares it with the planned value of work scheduled for that period and with the actual cost of 
work accomplished. As work is performed and measured against the baseline, the corresponding 
budget value is “earned.” From the basic variance measurements, the program manager can 
identify significant drivers, forecast future cost and schedule performance, and construct 
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corrective action plans to get the program back on track. But because the aggregated data is not 
necessarily predictive of a program’s future performance, some government and commercial 
sector reports (e.g., Card, 2008) suggest that earned value should not be considered a leading 
indicator. It is also rather easy to “game the system” so that a program appears to be progressing, 
when there are actually significant, albeit hidden, problems.  
Implemented by then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD[AT&L]) Ashton Carter in 2011, the should-cost/will-cost approach is similar to EVM but 
relies on two separate cost estimates: a non-advocate, historically based will-cost estimate, which 
provides the official basis for budgeting and programming; and a should-cost estimate for 
program management execution (Davies & Woods, 2011). The official budget baseline for the 
program is based on the non-advocate will-cost estimate. In contrast, the should-cost estimate is 
based on what the program manager believes is possible within “the context of creative, 
innovative, and disciplined measures to increase productivity” (Sledge, 2012, p. 1). 
Unfortunately, it does not appear that should-cost/will-cost provides managers with much 
incentive to build cost savings into their programs. On the one hand, program managers are 
required to budget to the historically based, and higher will-cost figure; on the other hand, they 
must drive their suppliers, and their own team, to the lower should-cost estimate.  
These five initiatives have not significantly improved the DoD’s acquisition outcomes, in part 
because monitoring and enforcement measures tend to be reactive (e.g., alerting the DoD and 
Congress of difficulties once they have occurred) as opposed to proactive (e.g., providing 
advanced warning of programs that are likely to encounter difficulty). Indeed, the longer a 
program is extended beyond its scheduled completion, the longer management should expect the 
program will take to complete. Or, in the words of economist Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007), 
“the longer you wait, the longer you will be expected to wait” (p. 159). Of course, costs increase 
as the schedule slips. 
This is why it is critical to identify issues and take corrective action as soon as future problems 
can be detected. Chalking up delays or cost increases to bumps in the road while hoping that the 
program will eventually find its way back on course is unrealistic and irresponsible. Instead, the 
program’s path must be altered, sometimes significantly. The one-time cost increase or minor 
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delay is a rare event indeed. Rather, schedule delays precipitate more schedule delays, and higher 
costs lead to still higher costs.  
It is clear that new projects can be more effectively planned, budgeted, and scheduled when 
historical data from previous similar programs are used (Rhodes, Valerdi, & Roedler, 2009). 
Indeed, the widespread use of EVM in both the public and commercial sectors attests to this 
commonsense reality. Should-cost/will-cost takes this approach a step further by not only 
determining how much a program will cost based on historical data, but also how much it should 
cost if, for example, sourcing were to be carried out more efficiently or if process redundancies 
were to be eliminated. 
However, historical data are not always reliable and, in fact, may be misleading, depending on 
how they are interpreted. This is especially true within the context of projects that rely on 
cutting-edge technology for which there is little precedent. By making use of better leading 
indicators, the DoD can better ensure that resources are consistent with the program’s 
development plan so that success can be more easily achieved.  
When product development is undertaken by the commercial sector, cost overruns, schedule 
delays, and program failure—while they do occur—are generally of a lower magnitude. 
Commercial sector processes seem to naturally constrain schedules and costs. Analyzing these 
processes will help inform the development of new leading indicators for the DoD.  
Generally, leading commercial firms have identified three critical junctures at which they must 
have sufficient knowledge to make large development decisions or to continue the development 
process. First, before the initial program development, customers’ expectations should be 
matched with the firms’ resources, including technology, engineering, time, and funding. Once a 
development decision has been made, program designers should ensure that they have sufficient 
resources to meet the performance requirements of that product, and the design of that product is 
stable enough for routine production. After this stage, program developers must show that the 
product can be fully developed and produced within budget, schedule, and performance targets.  
Paralleling these three critical junctures, there are three knowledge points. When the first point 
(technology development) is reached, future resources and needs match. At knowledge point 2 
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(product development), the design is stable. And at knowledge point 3 (production), the 
production processes are mature.  
Not only do commercial firms determine the level of knowledge needed to progress from one 
phase of a project to the next, but they also often determine the unit cost of the product early on 
in development in order to ensure that the projected market size will be realized. 
Whereas cost traditionally has been considered an outcome of product development, target 
costing treats it as an input. The target cost for a product is determined using a simple formula: 
Target Cost = Estimated Selling Price – Desired Profit. However, target costing is not merely the 
imposition of a cost ceiling. As Zengin and Ada (2010) pointed out, “manufacturers cannot make 
a trade-off between cost, quality, and functionality of the product with only cost considerations 
in mind” (p. 5594). Rather, target costing, as a strategy, promotes creativity and new ways of 
thinking to increase performance while discouraging the inclusion of non-value-added functions.  
Mihm (2010) observed that “target costing does not require perfect knowledge about the 
component” (p. 1334). Fairly accurate component cost estimates can be developed via systematic 
value analyses of comparable existing parts (Mihm, 2010). And whereas the target cost of the 
product remains firm throughout the development process, component cost estimates are 
permitted to fluctuate as product development evolves. Typically, each product feature is ranked 
in terms of its relative importance. Some firms may go as far as to assign specific numeric 
weights to each feature. These weights are then used to determine where the firm can adjust costs 
while maintaining, or even enhancing, the product’s value (Ellram, 2006). In order to ensure the 
inclusion of the most valuable features, the target cost of one component may be increased while 
that of another is reduced.  
Today, virtually every successful commercial firm employs a cost-driven approach to product 
development. For a variety of reasons, the DoD has been reluctant to do the same. But given 
current and impending budgetary constraints, it may soon have little choice in the matter. 
Admittedly, there are significant challenges that must be overcome in order for a cost 
requirement to be viable. In the commercial sector, not only is product development cost-driven, 
but it is also market-driven. Firms spend considerable sums in order to better understand what 
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the customer is willing to pay for; a firm that adds extraneous features of little added value to the 
customer is punished in the market.  
The domestic defense market, however, is characterized by very few firms in each sector and 
only one customer (i.e., a monopsony). Because weapon systems are contracted for in advance of 
their production, the contractor generally is not incentivized to translate the diffuse desires of the 
customer—in this case, the DoD—into an effective and efficient product. Rather, the DoD 
specifies requirements upfront, and in great detail, for fear that they may never be developed. In 
fact, there is frequently an incentive to “gold-plate” products by adding every desired feature, 
including some of little marginal value. This is especially true within the context of complex 
product development, where neither the DoD nor the contractor fully understands the attributes 
and capabilities of the end product.  
In the commercial sector, large retailers such as Wal-Mart have significant control over their 
supply bases because they have considerable buying power. Ellram (2006) noted that even in the 
manufacturing sector, large firms like Dell might be able to dictate pricing to companies like 
Intel. In the same way, the DoD must use all available strategies (e.g., competitive dual-
sourcing) to leverage its size and buying power and exert downward pressure on the cost of 
weapons systems.  
Leading indicators can help the DoD achieve product development success by drawing attention 
to essential elements that are automatically controlled within the commercial sector—and are 
thus often overlooked by the DoD. We note that the use of any cost control approach requires a 
trained and experienced acquisition workforce. The workforce must have sufficient 
understanding of industry behavior and incentives in order to achieve the desired results. 
We have derived several features of product development that we believe can inform the creation 
of meaningful leading indicators. We contend that these indicators can be used in two distinct 
ways: first, the use of indicators will ensure that fewer programs will begin development on a 
weak case, thus avoiding a costly, though all too common, mistake—initiating a program that 
should have not been started; second, the use of leading indicators will provide program 
managers with earlier warnings of impending difficulties as a program progresses, which 
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programs managers can take into account to correct minor difficulties before they become costly 
revisions. We describe several indicators below. 
Initial Program Requirements 
A primary reason for cost and schedule problems is the encouragement, within the acquisition 
environment, of overly ambitious product developments—sometimes referred to as 
“revolutionary” or “big bang” acquisition programs—that embody too many technical unknowns 
and insufficient knowledge about performance and production risks. Often, capabilities are not 
assigned to specific increments; rather, they are frontloaded onto the initial requirements 
document. By adopting an evolutionary approach, however, essential technologies can be fielded 
in the near term, delaying the instantiation of more time-intensive, costly, or technically 
challenging capabilities. An evolutionary approach also ensures that operational experience 
inform future versions of a product’s requirements. Once agreed upon by the relevant 
stakeholders, the impulse to add requirements must be avoided. If requirements are added, the 
program should be assigned a higher level of risk. 
Technology Readiness 
Failure to properly mature new technologies almost invariably leads to cost and schedule over-
runs in weapon system programs (GAO, 1999a). Recognizing this, the DoD already relies on 
technology readiness levels (TRLs) to assess the maturity of technologies, and the risks 
associated, before incorporating that technology into program development. TRLs provide a 
common understanding of technology status and thus help management in making decisions on 
the development and transition of technology. However, the DoD should also regard TRLs as 
leading indicators of potential problems, to be measured and monitored throughout early 
development and used to assign risk to programs accordingly.  
In addition, Gove (2007) and Gove, Sauser, and Ramirez-Marquez (2010) have developed and 
suggested the use of integration readiness levels (IRLs) to access the interfacing of compatible 
interactions for various technologies and the consistent comparison of the maturity between 
integration points (see Table 3). On a scale similar to TRLs, IRLs could be used in conjunction 
with TRLs to help optimize the process of complex system integration.  
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Senior Leadership  
DoD programs with strong senior leadership support were generally more stable and, as a result, 
were more successful. Those programs with strong senior leadership support, sometimes because 
they had a more immediate requirement, were viewed as a higher priority by senior leaders in the 
services and DoD. Further, this consistent leadership support from the DoD and the services 
promoted the development of better business plans and helped program managers adapt to the 
inevitable program perturbations (GAO, 2010c). Frequent changes in senior leadership can also 
lead to significant changes in an organization’s priorities, goals, and strategies. These changes 
also can significantly impact relationships with partnering organizations.  
Program Managers 
Program managers of successful programs tend to share key attributes, such as experience, 
leadership continuity, and communication skills that facilitated open and honest decision-
making. Their programs established sound, knowledge-based business plans before starting 
development and then executed those plans using disciplined approaches (GAO, 2010c). They 
also pursued incremental acquisition strategies and leveraged mature technologies, both of which 
are important leading indicators of program performance in and of themselves.  
Supporting Organization 
DoD programs are often large and complicated in nature, which calls for a team of professionals 
with diverse backgrounds and skills. Good staffing, of particular importance with today’s 
systems, ensures the right people are in place to help meet organizational goals. Unfortunately, 
the number of experienced military acquisition personnel has been reduced significantly, which 
we believe has contributed directly to problems with effective management of DoD acquisition 
programs. A critical assessment of the education, experience, and quality of the supporting staff 
can provide a good indication of a program’s likely performance. 
Requirements Volatility 
During program implementation, ineffective control of requirements changes leads to cost 
growth and program instabilities. One indicator that should be monitored is requirements 
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volatility (i.e., adding, deleting, and modifying a system’s requirements during the development 
process). These requirements changes generally will have an impact on several elements of the 
system. More problematic still is that the precise nature of the impact often cannot be anticipated 
(from a technical, schedule, or cost point-of-view). Developing an indicator that measures the 
rate of change of requirements over time can help forecast future program challenges (e.g., a 
surge in requirement changes could indicate potential risk to design, which in turn, could impact 
cost and schedule), as well as identify problems with the requirements generation process. 
Contract Changes 
Because the DoD’s needs change from time to time, government acquisition contractors 
generally have to unilaterally make change orders with regard to specifications and other 
contract terms. These changes may be related to contract cost, delivery schedule, fee, terms and 
conditions, and personnel. In addition, changing technologies, funding, and mission requirements 
may necessitate changes to a contract. The complexity of contracts—which can involve a variety 
of people with diverse backgrounds from different functional areas on both the government and 
contractor sides—can lead to misinterpretations and miscommunications of requirements and 
administrative issues that do not become evident until the contract is under way.  
Budget Stability 
In order to prevent a vicious cycle wherein reductions in quantity lead to increases in program 
costs, programs should ensure that there is an adequate management reserve (MR) in the budget. 
The MR budget is typically used by contractor program managers to cover unknown problems 
that arise during development and that fall under the scope of work. Technical complexity should 
inform the amount of the MR budget.  
 
Funding Flexibility 
In general, there is no single funding source for large, complex systems. Rather, funding is 
programmed through the individual services or through individual program offices for the 
individual system. As a result, there is no advocate for joint or, as the case may be, enterprise-
wide capabilities. Contracts are generally written that do not adequately specify how the 
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individual products are going to be integrated and tested with other elements. Program managers 
must treat funding stability as a leading indicator. In the event that a reliable funding source is 
unavailable, programs should be assigned a higher level of risk. 
Manufacturing Readiness 
The success of acquisition programs also requires that manufacturing capability be managed 
effectively. Manufacturing readiness levels (MRLs) were designed to assess manufacturing 
readiness and manage manufacturing risk during acquisition. They were developed by a joint 
DoD/industry working group under the sponsorship of the Joint Defense Manufacturing 
Technology Panel (JDMTP) and were introduced to the defense community in 2005.!Generally, 
MRLs serve three purposes: (1) to define the current level of manufacturing maturity, (2) to 
identify maturity shortfalls and associated costs and risks, and (3) to provide the basis for 
manufacturing maturation and risk management. The GAO (2009) recommended that weapon 
programs make use of MRLs. One possibility, in this regard, is incorporating the MRL scale into 
leading indicators that are measured and monitored across time in order to mitigate program risk. 
The leading indicators that we have proposed are less prone to manipulation in that they are 
discrete values that can be objectively measured. Unlike “work performed” (the typical EVM 
metric), the number of requirements, technical readiness levels, years of management 
experience, contract changes, and so forth cannot be as easily manipulated. !
Of course, there is always the danger that the leading indicators might be measured poorly or 
reported too late to be of use, but we contend that various safeguards can be put in place to 
prevent problems of this sort. For example, program managers might simply mandate that certain 
indicators be monitored and reported on a near-continuous basis. Further, under the leading 
indicators framework, there is explicit recognition that the indicators are designed to highlight 
deviations from planned values before these deviations become serious problems. The pressure 
to keep programs in the green—a common objective under EVM—is less of an issue. There is no 
motivation to hide problematic values because the values are indicative of potential problems, 
not actual ones.  
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It is also possible to aggregate leading indicators to determine a given program’s “score,” which 
might be helpful to gauge overall programmatic risk. Because the relative importance of a given 
indicator will likely vary across programs, each could be weighted prior to the launch of the 
program. The indicators could then be assessed and summed for an overall score at various 
points in time.  
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is but one technique that could be used. AHP allows 
users to compare incommensurable elements (in this case, requirements volatility, leadership, 
technical maturity, and so forth to the success of the program) in a rational and consistent way. 
By using AHP, program managers would have a better understanding of the relative importance 
of the chosen indicators.  
The success of large projects is often assessed in terms of schedule, cost, and quality—the so-
called iron triangle. However, a project that “fails” in any (or all) of these categories may go on 
to deliver large benefits to users, contractors, program personnel, and/or other stakeholders, 
especially as time passes. Conversely, projects that meet established requirements and that are 
completed on time and under budget may fail to meet the expectations of stakeholders.  
The challenge, then, revolves around how the DoD should define and measure program success. 
Even if leading indicators are used narrowly to help predict program “performance” (i.e., how 
the program rates, in terms of quality, cost, and schedule) with the understanding that success is 
more difficult to define, there is the possibility that needed programs will be canceled. The 
underlying point is that success is often achieved in an environment that permits some degree of 
failure. And failures, in turn, occur in an environment that encourages moderate risk-taking.  
Accordingly, programs that undertake the use of leading indicators must also consider the 
strategic importance of the program. In some instances, programs should take on higher levels of 
risk and be willing to accept moderate increases in schedule and cost. Unfortunately, such a 
suggestion rings hollow in an environment where most programs regularly exceed their budgets 
and schedules. We believe that implementing a system of leading indicators will help facilitate 




“We’ve been living with unconstrained resources for 10 years, and, frankly, 
we’ve developed some bad habits. … In our acquisition programs … there is 
certainly room to become more efficient.” 
 
–General Martin Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Cook, 2013) 
The United States is entering a critical period. National budgetary challenges will continue to 
exert downward pressure on the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) budgets, which are projected 
to decrease, and then flatten (see Figure 1). But these projections are deceiving because even if 
the top-line numbers remain stable (which, with Social Security, Medicare, and debt payments 
rising, seems unlikely) the DoD’s operation and support costs will continue to increase steadily. 
Within the DoD’s budgets, there are two cost drivers that are, in effect, entitlements. The first is 
military health care (Tricare), which has almost tripled from $19 billion in 2001 to $53 billion in 
2012. Healthcare for military personnel now consumes 10 percent of the entire defense budget. If 
left unchecked, healthcare will climb to $95 billion by 2030 (Cassata, 2013). Compensation for 
the DoD’s military and civilian employees is the second major driver. As compensation 
continues to increase, a growing portion of “defense discretionary” spending must be diverted to 
fund personnel costs, limiting the resources available for recapitalization, modernization, and 
transformation of the military. In the past, the DoD could rely on personnel reductions in order to 
constrain costs. Today, however, the active military force structure is already near an all-time 
low, meaning that significant reductions are unlikely. 
At the same time, the challenges to the nation’s security continue to proliferate. These challenges 
include regional instability, the continued threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
transnational terrorism, cyber-attacks, and the emergence of China as a potential peer competitor. 
Consequently, the DoD must strive to develop an acquisition strategy that is not only affordable, 






Figure 1. DoD’s Budget Authority in Constant FY 2013 Dollars 
The DoD’s attempts to improve the efficient and effective allocation of resources are regularly 
thwarted by misguided political forces. For example, as the DoD reduced its force size, Congress 
refused to approve the recommended base closures; and in spite of the 30 percent cost savings 
that derive as a result of public/private competitions for non-inherently governmental work, 
Congress decided to stop such competitions from taking place.  
The DoD also continues to face numerous difficulties in its major acquisition efforts. When one 
examines program cost growth—the positive difference between actual or projected costs and 
budgeted or initial estimated costs—one finds that most programs experience significant cost 
overruns, as well as lengthy schedule delays and reduced operational performance.  
Numerous reports have revealed that the DoD’s major weapon system programs have 
experienced high program cost-growth over an extended period of time. Figure 2 summarizes the 
findings of seven of these reports, which, collectively, examine programs ranging from 1946 to 
2003. All of the studies adjusted program cost-growth for inflation and quantity change relative 
to the Milestone (MS) II baseline, although the studies did not necessarily make such 
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adjustments in the same way (Arena, Leonard, Murray, & Younossi, 2006). A program’s cost-
growth was recorded as a cost-growth factor (CGF) relative to the total program’s original 
estimate. From reports that record this information, the development program cost-growth factor 
ranged from 1.25 to 1.58, while procurement CGFs ranged from 1.18 to 1.65. A program’s total 
CGF revealed a greater range of values—from a low of 1.14 to a high of 3.23. The most recent 
analysis (Arena et al., 2006) concluded that from 1968 to 2003, the average adjusted total cost 
growth for a set of completed weapon programs was 46 percent from MS II and 16 percent from 
MS III. In short, a variety of analyses from different time periods all recorded high program cost-
growth.  
 
Figure 2. Former Studies Chronicling Cost Growth 
Note. This information in this figure is from Arena et al. (2006). 
 
A recent GAO report echoes this familiar theme. The report notes that “DoD’s major weapon 
system programs continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities 
than originally planned” (GAO, 2008). Furthermore, the latest GAO analysis reported that when 
assessed against its first full estimates, the total cost of the DoD’s 86-program portfolio has 
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increased by over $400 billion. This figure included more than $90 billion in development cost 
growth and almost $290 billion in procurement cost growth. Additionally, there was an average 
delay of 27 months in the delivery of initial operating capability. For instance, the F-22 program 
(begun over 20 years ago) experienced development cost growth of more than 60 percent, a 
quantity reduction of more than 70 percent, and an increase in the unit cost of almost 200 percent 
(GAO, 2013). Needless to say, cost growth of this magnitude will be particularly problematic in 
the anticipated fiscal environment.    
Any number of problems might explain a program’s poor performance—inappropriate contract 
type or poor design and mismanagement are often cited. However, consistent poor performance 
across multiple programs reveals a larger issue: the failure to match acquisition needs with 
developers’ resources (e.g., technical knowledge, timing, and funding) when starting product 
development. In many cases, development is launched before knowing whether technologies and 
other capabilities will work as intended. The GAO (2010d) notes that despite the continued 
improvements in technology, design, and production, most DoD programs are still initiated with 
limited knowledge.  
Defense programs are begun with the best of intentions, but in order to ensure that programs are 
able to deliver their planned capabilities, the DoD should develop and adopt effective leading 
indicators—reliable and predictive metrics that provide earlier warnings of programmatic 
problems and challenges. The successful use of leading indicators could provide program 
managers, the DoD, and Congress with earlier warnings of program difficulty. Indeed, the longer 
a problem lingers, the more difficult and costly it is to correct. Currently, limited metrics are 
used to gauge the impact of investments or the effectiveness of processes to develop, 
demonstrate, integrate, and transition technologies (GAO, 1999a). However, most of the 
potential indicators of programmatic challenges are not monitored in real time; or, if they are, 
they merely present a “snapshot” of a program’s progress. Often, assessments are carried out 
after a program reaches a particular point in time (or development), or after the program 
concludes. In theory, these assessments, which rely on “trailing” or “lagging” indicators, might 
help program managers avoid similar problems on future programs—and yet such efforts have 
not been successful in solving the problem of escalating program costs. The bottom line is that 
5 
 
current metrics used to evaluate programs do not provide decision-makers with timely, 
consistent, reliable, or useful data, in that they rely on lagging indicators (i.e., they provide 
information about past performance).  
In an effort to better control costs, schedule, and product quality, leading indicators should be 
devised and implemented so that potential problems can be detected and corrective action taken 
before the problems fully develop. Identifying and mitigating problems early-on will obviate the 
need for costly “workarounds” (i.e., designing around a problem, technical or otherwise, that 
could have been avoided had the program altered course earlier).  
Report Roadmap 
The DoD continues to struggle to contain the costs of its weapons programs. We believe that 
leading indicators—measures that are predictive of future system performance before that 
performance is realized—can help the DoD better meet cost and schedule objectives and 
minimize the risk of program failure. In Part II, we describe past DoD strategies to control costs 
and outline what we believe to be a better approach. Looking to the commercial sector to derive 
some of the essential leading indicators is part of this approach, which we explore in Part III. In 
Part IV, we define a number of leading indicators, recognizing that these will vary across 
programs. We also provide a framework for how these indicators will be monitored and how 
they can inform the decision-making process. Finally, in Part V, we provide our concluding 
remarks.    
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II. Previous Initiatives 
In its effort to control the cost of weapon systems, the DoD has implemented a number of 
strategies, some of which rely on lagging indicators and others that purport to make use of 
leading indicators. For instance, Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) and the Nunn-McCurdy 
(NM) amendment use information on past performance in order to evaluate programs. Another 
strategy, cost as an independent variable (CAIV) is a strategy that sets a cost objective for an 
acquisition program, then manages the requirements and performance to meet that objective. 
Other strategies, such as earned value management (EVM) and, more recently, should-cost/will-
cost, are both designed to provide leading indicators of program performance. In the following 
section, we discuss these strategies, their advantages, their shortcomings, and some of their 
results to date. 
Selected Acquisition Reports 
SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and performance status. Prior to 1968, the 
DoD had no system for monitoring the progress of major systems (Hough, 1992). In order to 
facilitate internal cost control, the DoD introduced SARs in 1968. Soon thereafter, SARs were 
submitted to Congress on a regular basis. The GAO praised the SAR system, describing it as a 
meaningful management tool for measuring and tracking the progress of major acquisitions 
(Hough, 1992), and then-Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard asserted that the new 
system could be used to “clearly identify and explain the causes for increased costs that occur in 
the future” (Acquisitions Weapons Systems, 1969, p. 72). In 1975, the military departments were 
legally required to submit SARs. These reports generally are prepared annually; however, 
quarterly exception reports are required for those programs that have incurred unit cost increases 
of at least 15 percent, or schedule delays of at least six months. Quarterly, SARs are also 
submitted for programs that are re-baselined at major milestone decision points. 
The total program cost estimates provided in the SARs include research and development, 
procurement, military construction, and acquisition-related operation and maintenance. Total 
program costs reflect not only actual costs to date, but future anticipated costs as well. SARs 
have served as the primary source of research into cost growth for decades. Unfortunately, 
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however, SAR data cannot be used to identify a program’s cost drivers. This is because the 
reports classify cost growth using variance categories that only show the effects of secondary 
factors (Hough, 1992). These categories include economic escalation, quantity change, schedule 
slippage, engineering modification, and estimating changes. In pointing out the irony of David 
Packard’s initial hopes for the system, Hough (1992) asserted that “the failure to identify root 
causes of cost growth in the SAR … limits its utility to macroanalysis and identification of 
persistent problems” (p. 23).  
Nunn-McCurdy Amendment  
The NM, implemented in 1982 and modified in 2006 and 2009, requires the DoD to notify 
Congress when the unit cost growth of any major defense acquisition program is expected to 
exceed certain cost growth thresholds. Specifically, NM stipulates two levels of unit cost growth 
breach, referred to as the “significant level” and the “critical level.” A “significant” unit cost 
breach occurs if a program experiences cost growth over 15 percent of the current baseline 
estimate, whereas a “critical” unit cost breach occurs if a program experiences cost growth of 25 
percent over the current baseline estimate. This unit cost breach occurs if a program experiences 
unit cost growth above specified thresholds either as measured by total program acquisition unit 
cost (PAUC) or average procurement unit cost (APUC). 
The NM law requires a program manager to fulfill specific criteria when a program breaches. 
From 1982 to 2006, implementation of NM did not seem to have significant impact on 
acquisition outcomes. The most consistent criticism of NM was that the measure was ineffective 
because programs would avoid incurring an NM breach by establishing a new “current” baseline. 
The NM statute was amended in 2006 by the DoD Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-
163) to introduce new criteria. The new provision specified a second condition for incurring an 
NM breach: unit cost growth over the original baseline estimate. The revision did not change the 
reporting requirements for either the “significant” or “critical” unit-cost breach.  
Congress amended NM again with the Major Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009, adding two new requirements to the process of recertifying programs that incur an NM 
breach. A program with an NM unit-cost breach now must (a) rescind the most recent milestone 
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approval and (b) receive a new milestone approval before any actions regarding the contract may 
continue. The new milestone approval requires a certification that the costs of the program are 
reasonable, and the certification must be supported by an independent cost estimate that includes 
a confidence level for the estimate.  
However, despite these efforts, defense programs continue to experience high unit-cost growth. 
Unit-cost growth has remained high since NM was implemented in 1982. At the same time, the 
true impact of NM is unclear. The DoD’s data collection has been inconsistent because the DoD 
does not track acquisition information accurately or consistently across the entire department, 
nor is such information always provided in a timely manner. Definitions and baselines typically 
change multiple times over a program’s development cycle. The data that is reported tends to be 
of only marginal value. Moreover, most reported information is input oriented, and, as a result, 
no consistent linkages exist between the data and the actual performance of a program. 
In addition, NM generally identifies acquisition problems too late in the development process to 
allow program reforms to be effective. Although NM specifically states that Congress should be 
notified if a program manager believes that acquisition difficulties may occur, Congress is often 
not informed of a program's unit cost growth until an NM unit cost breach is imminent, or has 
actually taken place.  
Ultimately, by the time a program manager reports that a program will likely trigger an NM 
breach, the program is likely to be too far along in its development to significantly alter its 
course. In 2011, a RAND report identified common root causes of NM breaches, including the 
use of immature technologies, unanticipated integration issues, unstable funding, ambitious 
scheduling, and ill-conceived manufacturing processes and insufficient research, development, 
testing, and engineering (RDT&E). Needless to say, problems of this nature simply cannot be 
corrected in order to bring costs back within initial expectations. 
Cost as an Independent Variable 
Developed in the 1990s, CAIV strives to elevate the importance of cost within the trade space. 
All acquisitions are assessed based on their cost, schedule, and performance. Collectively, these 
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three parameters make up the trade space. Historically, performance has received the most 
emphasis and is often considered the independent variable. The other two parameters (i.e., the 
dependent variables) were varied as the program progressed, in order to maintain the desired 
performance. The goal of CAIV was to shift this emphasis from performance to cost, allowing 
variance in performance and schedule so that cost can be better maintained (Kaye, Sobota, 
Graham, & Gotwald, 2000). In short, this strategy attempted to create a cost-saving environment 
by emphasizing the importance of cost as well as flexibility with regard to performance and 
schedule.  
Under design-to-cost (DTC), the predecessor to CAIV, the primary focus centered on meeting 
the projected average unit procurement costs. It has been argued that DTC led managers to focus 
on reducing near-term production costs, to the exclusion of system life-cycle costs. However, 
under CAIV, program managers take into account the estimated complete life-cycle cost of the 
program and adjust cost and performance accordingly. Moreover, there is specific recognition 
that the best time to reduce life-cycle costs is early in the acquisition process (Land, 1997, p. 27). 
In fact, according to Newnes et al. (2008), “50–70% of the avoidable costs of a product are in-
built within the concept design stage” (p. 100). Similarly, research by Kluge (1997) suggested 
that most of the complexity in a product (and thus its cost) is generated by its design and not by 
customer demand. According to Kluge (1997), “complexity can, therefore, often be reduced 
without customers noticing much difference in the finished item … for instance, by standardizing 
parts and subassemblies” (p. 214). CAIV encourages program managers, when appropriate, to 
spend more money upfront in an effort to reduce production or operations and support costs.  
The key tenets of CAIV, according to the DoD’s Defense Acquisition Deskbook (1999), are as 
follows:  
• Requirements are stated in terms of capabilities and may be exchanged, substituted, or 
adjusted for the sake of another. Capabilities should be established at the system level 
and not at lower levels. 
• Early and continuous customer/warfighter participation in setting and adjusting program 
goals throughout the program is imperative. 
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• Trade space (i.e., cost gradient with respect to performance) around the cost objective is 
encouraged. 
• Realistic but aggressive cost objectives are set early and updated for each phase of an 
acquisition program. (p. 37) 
In 2002, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD 
[AT&L]) Edward “Pete” C. Aldridge Jr. required that all Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1 
programs use CAIV in order to control costs. In retrospect, however, it does not appear that use 
of the CAIV approach has achieved the desired results. To the contrary, a number of programs 
that relied on CAIV experienced, and continue to experience, major cost overruns. In the early 
1990s, the DoD selected eight programs to serve as CAIV flagships. These programs, it was 
believed, would demonstrate how this initiative could contain costs. In 1999, the GAO identified 
additional program offices that were “leaders” in the application of various acquisition best 
practices, one of which was the CAIV approach (GAO, 1999b, p. 22).  
SARs from 2010 featured five of the original flagship programs: the AIM-9X Sidewinder 
missile, the MIDS communications terminal, the JASSM cruise missile, the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter, and the SBIRS satellite program. The SARs also featured two of the programs that the 
GAO identified in 1999: the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (which is now known as the 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, or EFV), and the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
(AMRAAM). The changes in quantity and the percentage change in cost (adjusted for quantity) 










Table 1. CAIV Programs Cost Growth  
(Note: The information in this table is from GAO [1999b] and Selected Acquisition Reports from 2010.) 
 
None of the programs are below the initial estimated cost. In fact, among the seven programs, 
costs have grown by 47.6 percent on average—just slightly over the historic statistic (46 percent) 
cited in the 2007 RAND report referenced previously. Based on the wide range of percentages in 
Figure 3, one is led to conclude that the CAIV initiative is having little discernible impact, 
positive or negative, on program cost growth. Moreover, it is clear that CAIV did not enable the 
acquisition of planned quantities. In fact, if the JASSM, JSF, and EFV programs were to revert to 
their initial planned quantities, the percent change in cost would be significantly higher. 
Minimizing restrictions within the trade space by treating cost as an independent variable is a 
good first step. However, in practice, it appears that this approach, alone, does not go far enough.  
Earned Value Management 
EVM is a managerial tool that provides a systematic approach to the integration and 
measurement of cost, schedule, and performance on a project or task and uses those to estimate 
the completion time and cost. In June 2002, the Office of Management and Budget mandated the 
use of EVM systems for all major IT service and acquisition contracts. The DoD requires EVM 
on contracts worth more than $50 million and the application of at least some EVM principles on 
contracts worth more than $20 million. Over a decade ago, the secretary of defense decided to 
cancel the Navy A-12 Avenger II Program because of performance problems detected by EVM. 
Program Change in Quantity 
  
Percent Change in Program Cost  
(adjusted for quantity) 
AIM-9X    +93 +13% 
MIDS +1,666 +12% 
SBIRS     +1 +151% 
JASSM -429 +64% 
JSF -409 +58% 
EFV -432 +169% 
AMRAAM +2390 +41% 
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In the 1960s, the DoD developed the EVM process. EVM measures the value of work 
accomplished in a given period and compares it with the planned value of work scheduled for 
that period and with the actual cost of work accomplished. When using EVM, an integrated 
baseline is developed by time-phasing budget resources for the defined work, during the 
planning phase. As work is performed and measured against the baseline, the corresponding 
budget value is “earned.” From this earned value metric, EVM allows (1) relating time-phased 
budgets to specific tasks and to requirements contained in a statement of work; (2) providing 
accurate, reliable, and timely data; and (3) measuring project progress and performance with 
related costs, schedule, and technical accomplishments. From the basic variance measurements, 
the program manager can identify significant drivers, forecast future cost and schedule 
performance, and construct corrective action plans to get the program back on track. Therefore, it 
equips both the government and contractors with the ability to examine detailed schedule 
information, critical program and technical milestones, and cost-to-date data.  
EVM is superior to independent schedule and cost control for evaluating work progress and 
identifying potential schedule slippage and budget overruns. At the same time, however, 
program status reports derived through EVM are based on aggregated past performance, as 
opposed to discrete measures. Thus, it is not always possible to determine the immediate or root 
cause of cost overruns. Moreover, because the aggregated data is not necessarily predictive of a 
program’s future performance, or cost, some government and commercial sector reports (e.g., 
Card, 2008) suggest that earned value should not be considered a leading indicator. 
In addition, EVM, though widely advocated, has been applied very inconsistently over time, 
undermining its effectiveness. Several unfavorable findings from recent audits further indicate 
that EVM is not serving its intended function in the internal control process. GAO (2010d) 
identifies 11 key requirements for effective implementation of EVM in acquisition programs, 
grouped into three categories: establishing a sound EVM system, ensuring reliable data, and 
using earned value data to make decisions.  
The GAO’s (2010d) evaluation of EVM implementation in federal agencies finds that most 
programs do not fully implement the key practices needed to establish comprehensive EVM 
systems to help reduce acquisition risk. For example, some programs do not adequately 
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determine an objective measure of earned value and develop the performance baseline. Without 
having such baseline review, programs have not evaluated the validity of their baseline plan 
sufficiently to determine whether all significant risks contained in the plan have been identified 
and mitigated. Moreover, some programs do not define the scope of effort using a work 
breakdown structure. As such, programs lack a basis for planning the performance baseline and 
assigning responsibility for that work, both of which are necessary to accomplish a program’s 
objectives.  
The data problem obstructs the effectiveness of EVM substantially. The fidelity of the 
information produced by EVM is critical to providing an objective assessment of a program’s 
performance from which well-informed management decisions can be made. Thus, a critical 
precondition for effective use of EVM is that EVM data must be reliable before being used for 
decision-making. However, many acquisition programs did not fully ensure that their EVM data 
was reliable. Generally, most programs have established standard procedures to review earned 
value data, identify and record cost and schedule variances, and forecast estimates at completion. 
However, analysis of the EVM performance data and the variances from the performance 
baseline is still not adequate. 
In short, until EVM systems are fully implemented, acquisition programs face an increased risk 
that program managers cannot effectively use EVM as a management tool to mitigate and 
reverse poor cost and schedule performance trends. The GAO’s (2009) study of earned value 
data trends of the 16 federal programs indicates that most are currently experiencing cost 
overruns and schedule slippages.  
In addition to these two problems associated with EVM implementation, EVM as a managerial 
tool may suffer from other limitations. EVM may not be able to tell the whole story of program 
development. First, EVM has no provision to track project quality. Thus, it fails to show program 
managers qualitatively whether a program is in good shape or bad shape. For example, when 
EVM reports that a requirement in a program is 60 percent completed, it cannot show whether 
the completed part of the requirement represents close to what is acceptable in terms of quality. 
It could be that program performance (in terms of cost and schedule) is achieved at the expense 
of quality. Second, EVM metrics cannot reveal the reasons why a program might be 
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experiencing schedule or cost variances. And it may not accurately represent the cost and 
schedules that are most likely necessary for a project to achieve a particular functionality. By and 
large, it seems that heavy reliance on EVM has not improved program acquisition efforts.  
It is also relatively easy to “game the system” so that a program appears to be progressing, when 
there are actually significant, albeit hidden, problems. Programs are often coded as green, 
yellow, or red so that upper-level management can keep tabs on the status of multiple programs 
with relative ease. According to CIOinsight (2005), there are several “tricks” that can be used to 
keep a program in the green, which are as follows:  
• “Pad the schedule” by telling management that a three-month project will take four, 
which allows the program to keep up appearances and beat expectations, even if things 
are going wrong. 
• “Push problem tasks forward” so that a project can remain in the green for a longer 
period of time. 
• “Bump the task completion percentages” by changing the completion percentage of tasks 
that cannot be easily or objectively measured. 
• “Re-baseline the project,” after a small change request, by significantly elongating the 
schedule, which turns a red program green.  
• “Integrate late in the game,” which allows interoperability problems to remain hidden for 
the life of the program.  
While it might be unfair to suggest that program personnel consciously engage in devious 
practices, it is nevertheless the case that they are incentivized to keep their program in the green, 
rather than report problems to management early on. Indeed, even senior management must 
report to their superiors as well as to members of Congress, who no doubt prefer to see green 
programs. After years of development, a “green” program may yield a product of less than the 
desired value, with everyone involved feigning ignorance as to what went wrong. If EVM is to 
be resurrected, it must be viewed as a tool, and not a shield to hide behind. It should also be 
emphasized that EVM, like the other approaches, is complex. The successful use of EVM 




Implemented by then-USD(AT&L) Ashton Carter in 2011, the should-cost/will-cost approach 
was devised in response to anticipated national budgetary constraints identified by Congress. As 
of 2011, all ACAT I, II, and III programs use this approach. Simply put, should-cost/will-cost 
identifies low-value, high-cost elements of a program and seeks to increase value or decrease 
costs.  
Under this approach, two separate cost estimates are developed: a non-advocate will-cost 
estimate, which provides the official basis for budgeting and programming, and a should-cost 
estimate for program management execution (Davies & Woods, 2011). The official budget 
baseline for the program is based on the non-advocate, historically based, will-cost estimate, 
which is usually developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD’s) Cost Assessment 
and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office. CAPE estimates are typically derived by taking into 
account the costs of analogous programs. In contrast, the should-cost estimate is based on what 
the program manager believes is possible within “the context of creative, innovative, and 
disciplined measures to increase productivity” (Sledge, 2012, p. 1). In preparing their should-cost 
estimate, managers are encouraged to identify cost savings without relying on previous 
templates; rather, a should-cost review “attempts to break the cycle of historical-based cost 
estimation by challenging existing cost structures” (Sledge, 2012, p. 2). Accordingly, a should-
cost estimate can include alternative material solutions, the trading of subcomponents, or 
reductions in performance expectations (Carter, 2011). Under should-cost/will-cost, program 
managers pay close attention to the difference between the should-cost and will-cost estimate. At 
every milestone decision, the difference is calculated and used as a criterion by which to evaluate 
the program. 
According to a 1972 report by the Army Safeguard Office, “cost growth, the positive difference 
between ultimate cost and initial cost, is a function of the prevailing incentive systems, and 
incentive systems can be changed” (p. 3). Unfortunately, it does not appear that should-cost/will-
cost provides managers with much incentive to build cost savings into their programs. On the 
one hand, program managers are required to budget to the historically based (and higher) will-
cost figure; on the other hand, they must drive their suppliers to the lower, should-cost estimate. 
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Retired Army Colonel Nathanial Sledge (2012) writes that the new approach “reduces their 
management trade space, making it more challenging to demonstrate year-over-year progress” 
(p. 2). In other words, a program manager who works “to achieve a baseline of should-cost 
initiatives is shooting himself or herself in the foot” (Sledge, 2012, p. 3). 
The should-cost/will-cost approach has other disadvantages. For instance, the will-cost estimate 
is created early in the program and therefore is prone to inaccuracy for a multitude of reasons, 
including unstable requirements and unknown sourcing. Because program “savings” under 
should-cost/will-cost are expressed as the difference between the two estimates, an inaccurate 
will-cost estimate can make achieving cost savings impossible, or even too easy. Either way, one 
cannot help but think that the outcome is somewhat artificial. 
Finally, because system requirements are fixed but cost is not, it is virtually impossible to trade 
higher performance for lower costs. Just as it has in the past, this limitation will lead to the 
initiative’s eventual demise.  
A New Approach 
These four reforms have not improved the DoD’s acquisition outcomes significantly, in part 
because monitoring and enforcement measures tend to be reactive (e.g., alerting the DoD and 
Congress of difficulties once they have occurred) as opposed to proactive (e.g., providing 
advanced warning of programs that are likely to encounter difficulty). Indeed, the longer a 
program is extended beyond its scheduled completion, the longer management should expect the 
program will take to complete. Or, in the words of economist Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007), 
“the longer you wait, the longer you will be expected to wait.” This is somewhat counterintuitive 
and perhaps explains why program management persists in the sort of wishful thinking described 
in the previous paragraphs. In other words, it appears that some managers tend to think, perhaps 
unconsciously, that a program’s duration (or cost, for that matter) is constrained by an upper 
limit. That is, the more days that pass, the closer the program must be to its end. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case.  
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This is why it is critical to identify issues and take corrective action as soon as future problems 
can be detected. Chalking up delays or cost increases to bumps in the road while hoping that the 
program will eventually find its way back on course is unrealistic and irresponsible. Instead, the 
program’s path must be altered, sometimes significantly. The one-time cost increase or minor 
delay is a rare event indeed. Rather, schedule delays precipitate more schedule delays, and higher 
costs lead to still higher costs.  
So far, the discussion has revolved around the nature of prediction errors, but in the abstract. 
Note, however, that within the DoD, vicious cycles of ever-increasing costs can be attributed to 
very real characteristics of DoD programs. For instance, the majority of programs seek to 
develop, manufacture, and field a certain quantity of discrete platforms (e.g., airplanes, tanks, 
radios, etc.). Yet, because program costs are not adequately controlled during the design and 
development process, DoD programs often must reduce planned quantities in order to stay within 
their planned overall program budgets (GAO, 2001). The Air Force’s air superiority fighter, the 
F-22 Raptor, suffered this fate. As costs increased, quantities were reduced, causing program 
costs (adjusted for quantity) to increase, which, in turn, triggered further reductions in quantity. 
Originally, the Air Force planned to order 750 F-22s at a cost of $26.2 billion (Williams, 2002). 
Beginning in 1991, the Air Force reduced its order to 650 aircraft, then to 438 in 1994, and 
finally down to 183 in 2011. As late as 2006, the costs continued to climb from $361 million per 
aircraft, to $412 million per aircraft in 2012 (GAO, 2011). In the end, the F-22 was not procured 
in the numbers required to replace the F-15s. Moreover, the F-22, while praised by DoD officials 
and pilots alike, included far fewer capabilities than originally planned.  
It is clear that new projects can be more effectively planned, budgeted, and scheduled when 
historical data from previous similar programs are used (Rhodes, Valerdi, & Roedler, 2009). 
Indeed, the widespread use of EVM in both the public and commercial sectors attests to this 
commonsense reality. Should-cost/will-cost takes this approach a step further by not only 
determining how much a program will cost, based on historical data, but also how much it should 
cost if, for example, sourcing were to be carried out more efficiently, or if process redundancies 
were to be eliminated. 
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However, historical data are not always reliable and may in fact be misleading, depending on 
how they are interpreted. This is especially true within the context of projects that rely on 
cutting-edge technology for which there is little precedent. Those who devise the earned value or 
should-cost and will-cost estimates may, for instance, attribute a past program’s success to a 
certain process or program manager, while perhaps failing to recognize that the technology in 
question was less complex than the one that is currently under development.  
More broadly, it is important to remember that people select and recount events sequentially, 
thereby creating a narrative within which one assumes that one event was caused by a previous 
one. And even if one can accurately identify the proximate causes of particular program failures 
(or successes), it does not follow that the overall failure (or success) of the program can be 
attributed to the string of outcomes constructed by program personnel.   
The DoD should strive to eliminate potential problems early on so as to remove the guesswork 
that takes place after the fact. In all likelihood, a program’s failure can be attributed to a host of 
elements that interact in unpredictable ways. However, as mentioned previously, the root cause 
of program failure invariably comes down to a mismatch between the DoD’s needs and desires 
and its available resources, technical or otherwise. By making use of better leading indicators, 
the DoD can better ensure that resources are consistent with the program’s development plan so 
that success can be more easily achieved. Simply put, it is far easier to correct problems early on, 




III. Product Development in the Commercial Sector 
When product development is undertaken by the commercial sector, cost overruns, schedule 
delays, and program failure—although they do occur—are generally of a lower magnitude. The 
commercial sector processes seem to naturally constrain schedules and costs. In this section, we 
examine processes leading commercial firms use, and use this analysis to help inform the 
development of new leading indicators for the DoD.  
Knowledge-Based Development 
In order to survive and flourish under fierce market competition, commercial firms have to 
develop increasingly complex products in less time and under tight budgets. To achieve this goal, 
leading firms adopt a knowledge-based development process, ensuring that a sufficient level of 
knowledge exists at critical junctures throughout the acquisition process.  
 
Figure 3. Commercial Sector Approach to Product Development (GAO, 2004) 
Generally, leading commercial firms have identified three critical junctures at which they must 
have sufficient knowledge to make large development decisions or continue the development 
process (see Figure 5). First, before the initial program development, customers’ expectations 
should be matched with the firms’ resources, including technology, engineering, time, and 
funding. Once a development decision has been made, program designers should ensure that they 
have sufficient capacity to meet the performance requirements of that product, and the design of 
that product should be stable enough for routine production. After this stage, program developers 
must show that the product can be produced within budget, schedule, and performance targets. 
This process actually is an evolutionary and incremental one. Basic requirements in each phase 
should be achieved first, before the program is allowed to move forward. Together, these 
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practices ensure a high level of knowledge and thus a low degree of risks introduced into the 
acquisition process that could further result in favorable cost, schedule, and performance 
outcomes.  
Commercial firms find that this evolutionary development strategy is especially useful when the 
goal is to use new technology and reduce development duration. 
Paralleling these three critical junctures, there are three knowledge points. The requirements at 
each knowledge point must be met prior to moving forward. The knowledge points are described 
as follows. 
• Knowledge Point 1 (technology development): Resources and needs match. 
This point appears when a match is made between the market needs and commercial 
firms’ development capacities (knowledge, time, and budget). Leading companies use 
extensive communication mechanisms to reach customers in order to ensure that their 
needs could be aligned with the companies’ resources and abilities. Launching a program 
before requirements and resources are matched may result in a product that fails to 
perform as expected (e.g., more costs and longer development duration). 
• Knowledge Point 2 (product development): Product design is stable. 
Knowledge point 2 occurs as a product’s design is stable and reliable; the design meets 
customers’ requirements (including unit cost and being within the companies’ cost and 
time schedule as well). This is achieved at the product’s critical design review. Failure to 
ensure the stability of the design would result in costly design changes in development 
and production stages. 
• Knowledge Point 3 (production): Production processes are mature. 
Knowledge point 3 happens when the product can be manufactured with manageable 
cost, schedule, and quality. This is achieved by ensuring the statistical control in the 




Not only do commercial firms determine the level of knowledge needed to progress from one 
phase of a project to the next, but they often determine the unit cost of the product early on in 
development in order to ensure that the projected market size will be realized. In the commercial 
sector, this approach, known as target costing, was first introduced in Japan in the early 1960s. 
Today, it is widely used by commercial firms throughout the developed world, but is rarely 
implemented successfully within the DoD. 
Whereas cost traditionally has been considered an outcome of product development, target 
costing treats it as an input. The target cost for a product is determined using a simple formula: 
Target Cost = Estimated Selling Price – Desired Profit. But the number made public (and 
especially to the customer) is the selling price. The target cost is an internal target for the 
developer. 
 However, target costing is not merely the imposition of a cost ceiling. As Zengin and Ada 
(2010) pointed out, “manufacturers cannot make a trade-off between cost, quality, and 
functionality of the product with only cost considerations in mind” (p. 5594). Indeed, in today’s 
competitive global markets, a business that pursues such a strategy would quickly fold. Rather, 
target costing, as a strategy, promotes creativity and new ways of thinking to increase 
performance while discouraging the inclusion of non-value-added functions. As a result, today’s 
customers are able to purchase lower-cost, higher-quality products that meet their needs. Cooper 
and Chew (1996) described the logic behind target costing as follows: “Looking at today’s 
marketplace, the organization maps customer segments and targets the most attractive ones … 
and then determine[s] what level of quality and functionality will succeed within each segment, 
given a fixed target price, volume, and launch date” (p. 1). Gordon (2000) noted that many firms 
use target costing “as a way to focus on managing costs, rather than recovering costs through 
some form of cost-plus pricing mechanism” (p. 169).  
After the target cost is determined, it must be apportioned among the many internal cost centers, 
including marketing, manufacturing, general and administrative, logistics, distribution, and the 
price of purchased items (Ellram, 2006). Following this high-level allocation to features or 
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functions, costs are apportioned further at the level of the individual component, material, or 
service.  
Mihm (2010) observed that “target costing does not require perfect knowledge about the 
component” (p. 1334). Fairly accurate component cost estimates can be developed via systematic 
value analyses of comparable existing parts (Mihm, 2010). And whereas the target cost of the 
product remains firm throughout the development process, component cost estimates are 
permitted to fluctuate as product development evolves. Typically, each product feature is ranked 
in terms of its relative importance. Some firms may go as far as to assign specific numeric 
weights to each feature. These weights are then used to determine where the firm can adjust costs 
while maintaining, or even enhancing, the product’s value (Ellram, 2006). In order to ensure the 
inclusion of the most valuable features, the target cost of one component may be increased while 
that of another is reduced. The most successful firms continually rely on their sense of customer 
value as the basis for their cost-allocation decisions (Cooper & Chew, 1996). Indeed, even after 
the product is released, firms strive to increase the product value and incorporate any 
improvements into future iterations. Even within a single iteration, firms work to improve the 
manufacturing and other processes in order to reduce costs. The target costing process is 





Figure 4. Target Costing Process (Ellram, 2006) 
The automobile industry illustrates the benefits of target costing. With relatively few new 
manufacturers gaining ground in the market, reliability, cost, and performance are all major 
contributors to the quantity of vehicles a manufacturer sells. Accordingly, components and 
potential material solutions are stringently analyzed in terms of their cost and value to the 
customer. It is no mystery that the Japanese firm Toyota has had considerable, prolonged 
success, largely on account of its costing approach. Indeed, when asked why Toyota is a top-
selling car company, everyday Americans readily respond that it offers customers higher quality 
at lower cost.  
Today, virtually every successful commercial firm employs a cost-driven approach to product 
development. For a variety of reasons, the DoD has been reluctant to do the same. But given 
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current and impending budgetary constraints, it may soon have little choice in the matter. 
Admittedly, there are significant challenges that must be overcome in order for a cost 
requirement to be viable. In the commercial sector, not only is product development cost driven, 
but it is also market driven. Firms spend considerable sums in order to better understand what the 
customer is willing to pay for; a firm that adds extraneous features of little added value to the 
customer is punished in the market.  
The defense market, however, is characterized by very few firms in each sector and only one 
customer (i.e., a monopsony). Because weapon systems are contracted for in advance of their 
production, the contractor generally is not incentivized to translate the diffuse desires of the 
customer—in this case, the DoD—into an effective and efficient product. Rather, the DoD 
specifies requirements upfront, and in great detail, for fear that they never may be developed. In 
fact, there is frequently a perverse incentive to “gold-plate” products by adding every desired 
feature, including some of little marginal value. This is especially true within the context of 
complex, new product development where neither the DoD, nor the contractor, fully understands 
the attributes and capabilities of the end product.  
Take, for example, the development of the C-5, which, to this day, has a number of unique 
features. For example, the nose swings open on hinges so that, in addition to an aft ramp, a front 
ramp can be extended for easy loading and unloading of equipment. Another innovation is an 
automated, built-in test capability that “electronically monitors 600 test points, locates any 
troubles, and prints out repair instructions” (Shults, 1976, p. 4). The initial aircraft specifications, 
however, also called for a number of innovative features that in retrospect were a clear case of 
over-specification by the Air Force. For example, included in the original requirements 
document was the requirement for an in-flight airdrop capability—the aircraft would have to be 
able to airdrop single loads of up to 50,000 pounds from the rear cargo bay. There was also a 
requirement for advanced avionics that would allow the C-5 crews to identify drop zones and 
conduct airdrop operations at night or in poor weather. Further, there was a requirement for a 
terrain-following radar so that the C-5 could fly at low altitudes to evade detection by the enemy 
(Shults, 1976). Additionally, there was a requirement for the C-5 to be capable of landing on 
short, unimproved runways. Early criticism surrounding the inclusion of these features—many 
believed that they would never actually be used—was, for the most part, overlooked initially. As 
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it turned out, including these capabilities proved technically challenging and, ultimately, very 
costly to develop.  
Even though product-marketing input is less of a determinant in the cost of DoD systems, the 
DoD’s input can play a large role. Indeed, Figure 4 suggests that both types of input—product 
marketing and customer input—are essential. In the commercial sector, large retailers such as 
Wal-Mart have significant control over their supply bases because they have considerable buying 
power. Ellram (2006) noted that even in the manufacturing sector, large firms like Dell might be 
able to dictate pricing to companies like Intel. In the same way, the DoD must use all available 
strategies (e.g., competitive dual-sourcing) to leverage its size and buying power, and exert 
downward pressure on the cost of weapons systems.  
The pace of technological innovation is another example of market forces at work within the 
commercial sector. The accelerating rate at which new personal computers, smartphones, and 
MP3 players appear on store shelves is as much a function of new technology (creating the 
demand for new capabilities) as it is the accumulation by industry of users’ feedback and desires, 
the essential core of which is reflected in the design of the product. Once the two processes—
user input and technological innovation—merge, an uninterrupted loop spurs ever increasing 
gains in efficiency and performance. Because development is incremental, commercial firms are 
typically well-positioned to estimate costs.  
Firms can further refine the accuracy of these estimates by relying on standardized components 
that are manufactured by other firms (Rush, 1997). Automakers, for instance, often use 
standardized components because they are cheaper than built-to-order parts and generally come 
with a warranty, which reduces the manufacturer’s cost of long-term operations and support 
while maintaining the reliability of their products. 
For the DoD, it is often more challenging to pursue an incremental approach to development 
because the customer base for each product is relatively small and systems have relatively long 
life cycles. It can also be more challenging to incorporate commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
components into defense systems; barriers to their use include proprietary interfaces, stringent 
military environmental requirements, specialized cost accounting requirements, export controls, 
and continued cultural resistance.  
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These challenges notwithstanding, the DoD must strive to approximate the approach to cost 
management techniques that are used by commercial firms. Too often, the perceived uniqueness 
of the defense market is used to justify relaxed policies with regard to cost control. However, the 
commercial sector’s experience indicates that holding fixed the unit cost of a product is not only 
a possibility but also a preferable strategy in today’s competitive market. Although competition 
within the defense market is less fierce in some respects, the cost constraints faced by the DoD 
are no less significant. 
In a 2005 report, the GAO provided a telling glimpse into some of the dysfunction that plagues 
typical DoD programs:  
Leadership rarely separates long-term wants from needs based on credible, future 
threats. As a result, the DoD starts many more programs than it can afford—
creating a competition for funds that pressures program managers to produce 
optimistic cost estimates and to overpromise capabilities. Moreover, our work has 
shown that DOD allows programs to begin without establishing a formal business 
case. And once they begin, requirements and funding change over time. (p. 2) 
This description stands in stark contrast to the commercial sector’s targeted, knowledge-based 
approach to product development described in the previous section. Because the DoD does not 
operate in a market-driven, customer-competitive environment, in which technology, 
requirements, innovation, and cost constraints are shaped by both internal and external forces, it 
must steer product development through the conscious implementation of certain policies, 
procedures, and safeguards. The specifications that are built into Toyota’s next vehicle—in terms 
of cost and technology—are constrained, at least partially, by those that are offered by its 
competitors. In addition, Toyota can forecast the cost of these specifications with a high level of 
accuracy. Leading indicators can help the DoD achieve product development success by drawing 
attention to essential elements that are naturally regulated within the commercial sector—and 
thus often overlooked by the DoD.   
27 
 
IV. Leading Indicators 
Most of the indicators that DoD programs currently use reflect current status and historical 
trends. The goal of developing leading indicators is to enable better forecasts of a program’s 
performance in the future. In Section III, we described several features of product development 
that we believe can inform the creation of meaningful leading indicators. These indicators, which 
may rely on both qualitative and quantitative assessments, provide an indication of a program’s 
future performance.   
The DoD should develop indicators to monitor these features of product development. We also 
contend that these indicators can be used in two distinct ways:  
• First, the use of indicators will ensure that fewer programs will begin development on 
a weak case, thus avoiding a costly, though all too common, mistake—initiating a 
program that should have not been started.  
• Second, the use of leading indicators will provide program managers with earlier 
warnings of impending difficulties as a program progresses, which program managers 
can take into account to correct minor difficulties before they become costly 
revisions. 
The leading indicators that are used, as well as their relative importance, will undoubtedly vary 
across programs. However, there are some common indicators that will likely play a role in most 
DoD programs. Below, we describe these common indicators. Then, we discuss how program 
leadership might go about implementing leading indicators, determining their relative 
importance, and tracking them over time.  
Pre-Milestone B 
As mentioned, certain leading indicators can be measured prior to program launch in order to 
help determine a program’s long-term viability. These indicators include 
• initial requirements,  
• technology readiness, 
• senior leadership support, 
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• skilled program management, and 
• experienced supporting organization. 
 
Initial Program Requirements 
A primary reason for cost and schedule problems is the lack of clear tradeoffs among cost, 
schedule, risk, and requirements supported by rigorous system engineering, budget, and 
management processes during program initiation. This can be caused by either an incomplete set 
of requirements or a larger set of requirements (over-specified or “gold plated”) with a 
corresponding growth in the number and scope of key performance parameters. There is a 
tendency within the acquisition environment to develop overly ambitious products—sometimes 
referred to as “revolutionary” or “big bang” acquisition programs—that embody too many 
technical unknowns and insufficient knowledge about performance and production risks. 
Identifying all requirements as early as possible during the design phase is a difficult but 
desirable goal. Incomplete requirements can be a significant source of program difficulties, 
resulting in requirements volatility as the program matures and sees cost and schedule over-runs. 
The knowledge gaps are largely the result of a lack of early and disciplined systems engineering 
analysis of a weapon system’s requirements prior to beginning system development, which 
translates customer needs into a producible weapon system. If this early systems engineering is 
not performed, as has often been the case with the DoD’s major acquisitions in the past, 
significant cost increases can occur as the system’s requirements become better understood by 
the government and the contractor (GAO, 2010a).  
Such was the case with the DoD’s Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). With JTRS, functions 
that are traditionally built into a radio’s hardware were, instead, implemented through software. 
An open systems framework known as the Software Communications Architecture (SCA) was 
key to the system’s interoperability; it “told designers how elements of hardware and software 
are to operate in harmony” (Brown, Sticklan, & Babich, 2006, p. 1), thus enabling users of 
different JTRS variants (airborne, maritime, ground, fixed, etc.) to load and run the same 
software applications. However, the JTRS program’s failure to define the specific limitations of 
the available technology, and, instead, rely heavily on the SCA—a “responsive” and “flexible” 
architecture—leading to the belief that difficult technical problems could be addressed further 
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downstream (Gansler, Lucyshyn, & Rigilano, 2011). Unfortunately, this was not the case, and 
the program was eventually terminated. 
Even though evolutionary development is the preferred process for the development of the 
DoD’s systems, partial solutions are not always embraced. Often, all of the required capabilities 
are frontloaded onto the initial requirements document. By adopting an evolutionary approach, 
however, essential technologies can be fielded in the near term, delaying the instantiation of 
more time-intensive, costly, or technically challenging capabilities. Without an evolutionary 
approach, by the time the product is ready for production, the “next best thing” has already taken 
root in developers’ minds, hastening its obsolescence. Adopting an evolutionary approach 
whereby a basic capability is fielded—and incremental capability improvements are periodically 
made in subsequent blocks—can actually mitigate risk in the long-run. By shortening 
development timetables and ensuring the use of mature technologies, such an approach would 
reduce the risk of program delay and cost overruns. An evolutionary approach also ensures that 
operational experience informs future versions of a product’s requirements. 
Program decisions to begin design and/or production are too often made without sufficient 
knowledge. As a result, requirements tend to be overly ambitious and thus unachievable. The 
DoD has two choices: improve knowledge or lower user expectations. Because a system should 
not be designed as a final solution but as an initial response to a problem (Keating et al., 2003), 
the latter is more appropriate. However, within the DoD, requirements are often added 
throughout the development process that increase system complexity. This added complexity 
translates to longer schedules and higher costs.  
The number of a program’s requirements, and perhaps, more importantly, the extent to which all 
of the requirements are planned for the initial release, provide an indication of future schedule 
and cost growth. Once agreed upon by the relevant stakeholders, the impulse to add requirements 
must be avoided. And, as requirements are added and changed, the program should be assigned a 




Failure to properly mature new technologies almost invariably leads to cost and schedule over-
runs in weapons system programs (GAO, 1999a). Recognizing this, the DoD already relies on 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) to assess the maturity of technologies, and the risks 
associated, before incorporating that technology into program development. TRLs provide a 
common understanding of technology status and thus help management in making decisions on 
the development and transition of technology. The TRL classification system was originated by 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the 1980s and was later adopted 
by the DoD (see Table 2). The DoD treats TRLs as benchmarks. In fact, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 
5000.02 prevents the award of an engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract 
before the relevant technologies reach TRL 6. However, the DoD should also regard TRLs as 
leading indicators of potential problems, to be measured and monitored throughout early 
development, and assign risk to programs accordingly.  
It is important to recognize that TRLs do not assess uncertainty involved in maturing and 
integrating a technology into a system and thus cannot assess maturity at the system level (Gove, 
Sauser, & Ramirez-Marquez, 2010). DoD systems have become more complex, generally 
supporting a variety of users and requiring large numbers of developers and maintainers. The 
intricacy of the many internal and external interfaces contributes significantly to this complexity. 
Most importantly, today’s systems are software-intensive, creating a greater integration 
challenge based on the innumerable, potential logic paths. Moreover, functionality that, in the 
past, was deeply embedded in the physical configuration of components “has begun to emerge as 
software, enabling synergies among components that would have been unimaginable only a few 
years ago” (National Research Council, 2008, p. 18). This creates an increasing integration 






TRL Definition Description 
9 Actual system proven through 
successful mission operations. 
Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission 
conditions, such as those encountered in operational test and evaluation. 
Examples include using the system under operational mission conditions. 
8 Actual system completed and 
qualified through test and 
demonstration. 
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under expected 
conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the end of true system 
development. Examples include developmental test and evaluation of the 
system in its intended weapon system to determine if it meets design 
specifications. 
7 System prototype demonstration 
in an operational environment. 
Prototype near, or at, planned operational system. Represents a major step 
up from TRL 6, requiring demonstration of an actual system prototype in 
an operational environment such as an aircraft, vehicle, or space. 
Examples include testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft.  
6 System/subsystem model or 
prototype demonstration in a 
relevant environment. 
Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond that of 
TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. Represents a major step up in a 
technology’s demonstrated readiness. Examples include testing a 
prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated 
operational environment. 
5 Component and/or breadboard 
validation in relevant 
environment. 
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic 
technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so it can be tested in a simulated environment. 
Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory integration of components. 
4 Component and/or breadboard 
validation in laboratory 
environment. 
Basic technological components are integrated to establish that they will 
work together. This is relatively “low fidelity” compared with the eventual 
system. Examples include integration of “ad hoc” hardware in the 
laboratory. 
3 Analytical and experimental 
critical function and/or 
characteristic proof of concept. 
Active R&D is initiated. This includes analytical studies and laboratory 
studies to physically validate the analytical predictions of separate 
elements of the technology. Examples include components that are not yet 
integrated or representative. 
2  Technology concept and/or 
application formulated.  
Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical 
applications can be invented. Applications are speculative and there may 
be no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumptions. Examples are 
limited to analytic studies.  
1 Basic principles observed and 
reported  
Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to be 
translated into applied research and development. Examples might include 
paper studies of a technology’s basic properties. 
 
Table 2. Technology Readiness Levels in the DoD  
(Note: The information in this table is from DoD, 2011.) 
 
Indeed, Mosher (2000) highlighted system integration as the most difficult part of any 
development program. Henderson and Clark (1990) emphasized that systems often fail because 
attention is given to the technology while knowledge of the linkages/integrations is overlooked. 
It is clear that an additional indicator is needed for system-level assessment. Gove (2007) and 
Gove, Sauser, and Ramirez-Marquez (2010) have developed and suggested the use of Integration 
Readiness Levels (IRLs) to access the interfacing of compatible interactions for various 
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Table 3. Integration Readiness Levels 
 (Note: The information in this table came from Gove, Saucer, & Ramirez-Marquez, 2007) 
 
On a scale similar to TRLs, IRLs could be used in conjunction with TRLs to help assess the 
integration of complex system. Specifically, IRLs could serve the following goals: 
• Provide an integration-specific metric to determine the integration maturity between 
two or more configuration items, components, and/or subsystems. 
• Provide a means to reduce the uncertainty involved in maturing and integrating a 
technology into a system. 
• Provide the ability to consider the meeting of system requirements in the integration 
assessment so as to reduce the integration of obsolete technology over less mature 
technology. 
• Provide a common platform for both new system development and technology insertion 
maturity assessment. 
 
Senior Leadership  
DoD programs with strong senior leadership support generally are more stable and as a result are 
more successful. Those programs with strong senior leadership support, sometimes because they 
had a more immediate requirement, were viewed as a higher priority by senior leaders in the 
services and DoD. Further, this consistent leadership support from DoD and the services 
promoted the development of better business plans and helped program managers to adapt to the 
inevitable program perturbations (GAO, 2010c).  
This senior leadership support translates into greater attention throughout the acquisition 
hierarchy. This was vividly demonstrated by the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) 
vehicle program, perhaps the largest and fastest industrial mobilization effort since World War 
II. Secretary of Defense Gates galvanized support for the MRAP program and became its most 
important champion. In the words of General Petraeus (2010), “Secretary Gates’ direction was a 
key catalyst and a pretty key factor in production of the MRAPs.” In May of 2007, his fifth 
month in office, Gates declared the MRAP the DoD’s top acquisition priority, and called for 
“any and all options to accelerate the production and fielding of this capability” (Osborn, 2007). 
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Once the requirement was formally approved, the vehicles began to arrive in theater within six 
months (Gansler, Lucyshyn, & Varettoni, 2010). Although the Secretary of Defense cannot be 
expected to be personally involved to this degree, with every major DoD program, high-level 
support helps to ensure a program’s success.   
Within the DoD, very high-level acquisition positions require private sector industry experience. 
Indeed, the most qualified senior leaders have often spent a considerable amount of time working 
in the private sector. Unfortunately, political appointees in senior DoD leadership positions serve 
an average of only 18–24 months (Aerospace Industries Association, 2007) and, as a result, may 
have limited sustained impact on a specific program. In addition, DoD programs may not begin 
to field useful capabilities for several years. As a result, political appointees may be less inclined 
to launch large new programs in the first place.  
In addition, career government executives sometimes adopt a wait-and-see attitude with regard to 
incoming appointees. Executives, who “personify the cultures of their departments” and have 
“intimate knowledge on how things really are accomplished in day-to-day operations,” may 
regard appointees’ visions of their program as unrealistic (Parchem & Gowing, 2009, p. 1). 
According to Parchem and Gowing (2009), the collision of idealism and practicality “can cause 
the actual productivity of the organization to come to an abrupt halt” (p. 1). 
Frequent changes in senior leadership (political and military) can also lead to significant changes 
in an organization’s priorities, goals, and strategies. These changes can also significantly impact 
relationships with partnering organizations. At the program level, the lack of sustained leadership 
often contributes to program delays and setbacks, which can create tension among stakeholders. 
Frequent leadership turnover can also insulate and strengthen the existing organizational culture. 
Long-term or permanent employees may be reluctant to participate in organizational change 
initiatives that significantly change their day-to-day responsibilities when the leaders who 
initiated these changes are not present to see them through. Consistent senior leadership support 




Program managers of successful programs tend to share key attributes, such as experience, 
leadership continuity, and communication skills that facilitated open and honest decision-
making. Their programs established sound, knowledge-based business plans before starting 
development and then executed those plans using disciplined approaches (GAO, 2010c). They 
also pursued incremental acquisition strategies and leveraged mature technologies, both of which 
are important leading indicators of program performance in and of themselves. They were able to 
invest in early planning and systems engineering, and made trade-offs to close gaps between 
customer needs and available resources to arrive at a set of requirements that could be developed 
within cost and schedule targets. After approval, the programs resisted new requirements and 
maintained stable funding.  
Such was the case with the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) program. In the early 1990s, 
Congress authorized the DoD to launch a small number of pilot programs that, to the extent 
possible, would rely on standard business practices. These programs were known as Defense 
Acquisition Pilot Programs (DAPP). Program managers were afforded considerable autonomy 
and were able to bypass several of the more lengthy documentation and reporting requirements. 
The JDAM program was among the first of these pilot programs. Its program manager, Terry 
Little, took full advantage of the flexibility he was granted. Little conducted a two-week training 
on how to work in a more commercialized environment. Little made it clear to his team that he 
would not tolerate the old way of doing business on this project (Ingols & Brem, 1998). 
 
In 1999, during Operation Allied Force (NATO operations in Yugoslavia), U.S. bombers 
launched over 600 JDAMs with 96 percent reliability and hitting 87percent of intended targets 
(Myers, 2002). Over time, as technology improved, the Air Force and Navy acquired updated 
versions with enhanced guidance technology that could be used on newer aircraft. Today, the 
average per-unit production cost, adjusted for inflation, remains about the same 
(GlobalSecurity.org, 2011). It is clear that the firm price ceiling, demanded by the Air Force 
chief of staff and achieved by Little and his team, in addition to the accelerated acquisition plan 
and the use of off-the-shelf components and other commercial practices, resulted in significant 
cost savings and allowed the Air Force to acquire the required quantity of weapons. 
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These practices are in contrast to prevailing pressures in the DoD that force programs to compete 
for funds by exaggerating achievable capabilities, underestimating costs, and assuming 
optimistic delivery dates. Program managers of stable and successful programs are able to make 
knowledge-based, disciplined decisions from the start and resist pressure to overreach or add 
requirements because of this strong institutional support (GAO, 2010c).  
In addition to support from the top, program managers from successful programs tended to have 
similar attributes for success such as experience, leadership continuity, and communication skills 
that facilitated open and honest decision-making. These program managers were empowered to 
make good decisions, allowing them to be accountable for the success or failure of the program. 
Having skilled, experienced program managers is a key indicator for a successful program. 
Experienced Supporting Organization 
The DoD’s programs are often large and complex, and, as a result, there is a need for a team of 
professionals with diverse backgrounds and skills to manage them. The DoD’s acquisition 
workforce is often lacking in numbers, skills, and experience. Between 1990 and 2000, the 
acquisition workforce was cut by a total of 60 percent. As the DoD’s budgets grew significantly 
during the first decade of the 21st century, the acquisition workforce failed to keep pace. Further, 
within the military, there has been a long-time belief that acquisition and contracting work was a 
mere administrative function, which ultimately contributed to a general disinterest in these career 
paths across all services. In some cases, individuals without proper training and/or experience are 
given acquisition positions (most notably those undertaking contingency contracting 
responsibilities and, more recently, those assigned as contracting officer’s representatives). In 
fact, in 2013, approximately 55 percent of the total DoD acquisition workforce had less than five 
years of experience—most of the recent hiring had been of “interns.” !
Moreover, in the past, the DoD was at the cutting edge of technology, leading the innovation in 
jet engines, space, and microelectronics; however, during the last few decades, with the growing 
commercial importance of information technologies, the private sector has taken the lead. And, 
although the DoD’s older employees may have extensive acquisition experience, their technical 
skills frequently have not kept up with the rapidly evolving information technology. 
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Accordingly, these legacy employees are significantly less likely than their private-sector 
counterparts to have the requisite skills for the DoD’s current complex requirements.  
We note that the use of any cost control approach requires a trained and experienced acquisition 
workforce. The workforce must have sufficient understanding of industry behavior and 
incentives in order to achieve the desired results. Current shortages of experienced acquisitions 
personnel are of particular concern. For obvious reasons, the DoD can rely on contractors only 
up to a certain point; that is, the DoD cannot outsource program management, or management 
and oversight of systems engineering, and expect to acquire efficient, affordable systems 
(National Research Council, 2008).  
Recruiting qualified, experienced systems engineers is a challenge not only for the DoD, but for 
industry, too. The problem is twofold. First, the production of systems engineers by U.S. 
universities has increased very slowly over the past decade, despite increased demand, growing 
salaries, and other incentives. Second, formal knowledge of the systems engineering discipline 
only goes so far; to be successful within the discipline, one must also have specific domain 
experience (National Research Council, 2008, p. 9).  
A good staffing strategy summarizes approaches to identify, attract, and retain a qualified and 
diverse pool to meet current, ongoing, and future staffing needs. Key civilian staff, such as senior 
engineers, often serve many years in the program office and provide continuity and information 
necessary for knowledge-based decision making. The GAO (2010b) noted that the continuity of 
key civil service and contractor personnel has proven very beneficial because several other 
personnel have left the program due to military deployments and reassignments. Long-term staff 
planning, undertaken in conjunction with acquisition goals, secures the skills and abilities needed 
to achieve those goals. To help fill the shortages, programs have often turned to systems 
engineering and technical assistance (SETA) contractors to cover the shortages. But, even when 
they are used, the DoD must be able to manage and oversee the SETA providers.  
A critical assessment of the education, experience, and quality of the supporting staff can provide 
a good indication of a program’s performance. For instance, a simple chart indicating the number 
of unfilled position vacancies would highlight potential risk to program cost and schedule. 
Program offices should identify and track critical positions, as well as the total actual head count 
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for both quantity and quality (education and experience). This indicates that the program has the 
minimum staffing required to execute the planned program. If there are staffing shortfalls, the 
program can anticipate future challenges. 
Progress Indicators 
Once the program is under way, management should rely on indicators that signal impending 
difficulties, technical or otherwise. Leading indicators include 
• requirements volatility,  
• contract changes,  
• budget stability, 
• funding flexibility, and  
• manufacturing readiness.  
Requirements Volatility 
During program implementation, ineffective control of requirements changes leads to cost 
growth and program instabilities. One indicator that should be monitored is requirements 
volatility (i.e., adding, deleting, and modifying of a system’s requirements during the 
development process). These requirements changes generally have an impact on several 
constituent systems. More problematic still is that the precise nature of the impact often cannot 
be anticipated (from a technical, schedule, or cost point of view). At best, several subsystems 
must be modified to compensate for, or otherwise facilitate, the modifications to other sub-
systems as they occur. Of course, each time a modification is made, thorough simulation and 
testing is required. At worst, if the change is fully integrated, serious system-level challenges 
may result.  
The problem is two-fold. On the one hand, the process by which requirements are generated and 
approved may not fully consider the impact to the development program’s cost and schedule. 
High levels of requirements volatility extend development, and, as a result, long-duration 
programs are viewed as works in progress that often fail to deliver the initially envisioned 
functionality. On the other hand, ignoring requests for necessary requirements changes early in a 
program can cost significantly more to remedy, once the system has been fielded. Consequently, 
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failure to aggressively monitor and manage a system’s requirements can increase the 
development time and cost.  
Take the case of the Global Hawk, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that has been used 
extensively in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The program, initiated in 1995, was designed to 
undergo multiple blocks of development; the most important goal of each block was to remain 
within the cost requirement of $10 million per unit and to keep the program on schedule 
(Gansler, Lucyshyn, & Spiers, 2008). Following the operational success of the first iteration (the 
RQ-4A), the Air Force decided to design a new, larger, and more capable variant of the Global 
Hawk, known as the RQ-4B. Originally, the RQ-4B components were to be 90 percent 
compatible with the A model. But in an effort to expand the UAV’s capabilities, the Air Force 
altered the requirements to produce a significantly larger B variant. The B variant, as designed, 
would carry a 50 percent larger payload, fly two hours longer, and retain the approximate 10,000 
nm range.  
These seemingly marginal requirement shifts necessitated major reengineering. The development 
of the RQ-4B project was to be funded with the original budget for the 4A; however, the Air 
Force removed cost as a requirement, relegating it to a consideration (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 
2013). Many independent commentators have regarded the Global Hawk RQ-4A program as a 
great success. However, the restructured Global Hawk program has faced significant cost and 
schedule difficulties (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2013).  
Developing an indicator that measures the rate of change of requirements over time can help 
forecast future program challenges (e.g., a surge in requirement changes could indicate potential 
risk to design, which in turn could impact cost and schedule), as well as identify problems with 
the requirements generation process. 
Contract Changes 
Because the DoD’s needs can change, acquisition contractors are required to accept contract 
change orders that alter specifications and other contract terms. Of course, they must also price 
these changes. The complexity of contracts—which can involve a variety of people with diverse 
backgrounds from different functional areas on both the government and contractor sides—can 
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lead to misinterpretations and miscommunications of requirements and administrative issues that 
do not become evident until the contract is under way.  
However, contract changes are often the source of a significant number of disputes between 
contracting parties. Changing a contract too frequently complicates the DoD’s acquisition 
efforts, especially if the contract is large and complex. Tracking these changes can provide the 
DoD with an indication of program stability. 
Budget Stability 
Funding instability continues to drive up costs and delays the eventual fielding of new systems 
(S. Rep. No. 109-069, 2005). Successful acquisition programs require accurate planning and 
stable budgets. Unfortunately, within the DoD, this stability rarely exists. The instability arises 
when Congress moves funds from specific program elements for non-programmatic reasons. The 
services have, at times, also moved procurement funds to pay military personnel and operations 
and maintenance bills, which have combined to create a root cause for program instability (DoD, 
2006).  
When the actual funding is less than the planned funding, work must be delayed or deferred, 
resulting in program disruption. Budget reallocations and shortfalls result in the purchase of 
reduced quantities and/or programs that are extended beyond initial schedule estimates. The end 
result is short-term savings—but the price is long-term cost and schedule growth. Further, 
variability between annual budget predictions and the ultimate budget authority makes program 
planning difficult.  
As mentioned, DoD programs often must reduce planned quantities in order to stay within their 
planned budgets. The Air Force’s air superiority fighter, the F-22 Raptor (as previously 
discussed), suffered this fate. As costs increased, quantities were reduced, causing program costs 
(adjusted for quantity) to increase, which, in turn, triggered further reductions in quantity.  
In order to prevent a vicious cycle wherein reductions in quantity lead to increases in program 
costs, programs should ensure that there is an adequate management reserve (MR) budget. The 
MR budget is typically used by contractor program managers to cover unknown problems that 
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arise during development that fall under the scope of work. Unlike the F-22 program’s MR 
budget of only 2 percent (which it exhausted within the first year of engineering and 
manufacturing development [EMD]), the F-18 program’s MR budget was 10 percent. According 
to a 2005 RAND report, the F-18’s MR budget contributed directly to the program’s budget 
stability and prolonged success (Younossi, Stem, Lorell, & Lussier, 2005).  
 
Technical complexity should inform the amount of the MR budget. While the MR budget can be 
expressed as a percentage of the total budget, uncertainty analysis can also be used to determine 
the probability that the cost of work will be less than or equal to its budget. Goldberg and Weber 
(1998) termed this calculation the “probability of success.” Christensen and Templin (2000) 
noted that the amount of an MR budget can be identified at any desired probability of success 
specified by project management. The MR budget, its amount, and how it was determined should 
be viewed as a leading indicator by program personnel. 
 
Funding Flexibility 
In general, there is no single funding source for large, complex, and/or joint (multiservice) 
systems (this is particularly true for systems-of-systems). Rather, funding is programmed 
through the individual services or through individual program offices for the individual system. 
As a result, there is no advocate for joint or, as the case may be, enterprise-wide capabilities. As 
a result, contracts are generally written that do not adequately specify how the individual 
products are going to be integrated and tested with other elements. 
Even in instances when a central authority is tasked with allocating funds among different 
systems, funding rarely is reallocated in response to changes brought on by the system’s 
evolution. Once the funding is allocated, individual program offices intend to use it and often go 
to considerable lengths to justify their expenses in the event that their funding levels are 
jeopardized. Program managers must treat funding stability as a leading indicator. In the event 
that a reliable funding source is unavailable, programs should be assigned a higher level of risk. 
Take, for instance, the Coast Guard’s recent modernization effort, Project Deepwater, which 
sought to develop multiple integrated assets (ships, cutters, airplanes, satellites, etc.) to replace 
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an aging fleet. The project relied on yearly appropriations from Congress for funding. Imprecise 
price estimates, coupled with miscalculated bids—companies tend to underestimate cost in initial 
bids in order to win a contract—resulted in inadequate funding. The lack of funding resulted in 
significant delays, which increased costs further. In addition, budgetary trade-offs during 
development were rare, especially after the program’s reorganization, because funds were 
designated to each asset rather than to the system as a whole, encouraging the optimization of 
each asset. Indeed, no system came in under budget; rather, most required additional funding.   
The trend toward participating in multinational programs (e.g., the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter) has 
also greatly compounded the funding problem. Different countries, contributing different 
amounts, have their own relative priorities and different budget cycles. Exchange variations, 
different acquisition policies, and languages add even more complexity. 
Manufacturing Readiness 
The success of acquisition programs also requires that manufacturing capability be managed 
effectively. The GAO (2009) found that a lack of manufacturing knowledge at key decision 
points largely leads to cost growth and schedule slippages in major DoD acquisition programs. 
Manufacturing readiness levels (MRLs) were designed to assess manufacturing readiness and 
manage manufacturing risk in acquisition. They were developed by a joint DoD/industry 
working group under the sponsorship of the Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel 
(JDMTP) and introduced to the defense community in 2005. DoDI 5000.02 requires evaluations 
of manufacturing status and risks as part of defense acquisition programs. It establishes target 
maturity criteria for measuring risks associated with manufacturing processes at Milestones A, B, 
and C, and Full-Rate Production.  
The DoDI elaborated that one of the purposes of the EMD Phase is to “develop an affordable and 
executable manufacturing process.” Further, the system capability and manufacturing process 
demonstration shows “that system production can be supported by demonstrated manufacturing 
processes”; and the EMD Phase ends when “manufacturing processes have been effectively 
demonstrated in a pilot line environment.” The two entrance criteria for the Production and 
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Deployment Phase are “no significant manufacturing risks” and “manufacturing processes [are] 
under control.” 
Manufacturing readiness was intended to go hand in hand with technology readiness. 
Manufacturing readiness is governed by technology readiness and design stability because 
manufacturing processes are not able to mature until the product technology and product design 
are stable. The intent was to create a measurement scale that would be similar to the TRLs. Thus, 
MRLs were designed with a numbering system to be roughly congruent with comparable levels 
of TRLs. The MRLs were developed to include a nominal level of technology readiness as a 
prerequisite for each level of manufacturing readiness (DoD, 2009). 
Generally, MRLs serve three purposes: (1) to define current level of manufacturing maturity, (2) 
to identify maturity shortfalls and associated costs and risks, and (3) to provide the basis for 
manufacturing maturation and risk management. The GAO (2009) recommended that weapons 
programs make use of MRLs. One possibility, in this regard, is incorporating the MRL scale into 
leading indicators that are measured and monitored across time in order to mitigate program risk. 
There are ten MRLs (numbered 1 through 10; see Table 4) that are correlated to the nine TRLs in 






Table 4. Manufacturing Readiness Level Scale (DoD, 2010) 
MRL Definition Description
10 Full Rate Production 
demonstrated and lean 
production practices in place
This is the highest level of production readiness. Technologies should have matured 
to TRL 9. This level of manufacturing is normally associated with the Production or 
Sustainment phases of the acquisition life cycle.  Engineering/design changes are few 
and generally limited to quality and cost improvements. System, components or items 
are in full rate production and meet all engineering, performance, quality and 
reliability requirements.  Manufacturing process capability is at the appropriate 
quality level. 
9 Low rate production 
demonstrated; Capability in 
place to begin Full Rate 
Production
At this level, the system, component or item has been previously produced, is in 
production, or has successfully achieved low rate initial production. Technologies 
should have matured to TRL 9.
8 Pilot line capability 
demonstrated; Ready to begin 
Low Rate Initial Production
This level is associated with readiness for a Milestone C decision, and entry into Low 
Rate Initial Production (LRIP). Technologies should have matured to at least TRL 7. 
Detailed system design is complete and sufficiently stable to enter low rate 
production.
7 Capability to produce systems, 
subsystems, or components in 
a in a production 
representative environment
This level of manufacturing readiness is typical for the mid-point of the Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase leading to the Post-CDR Assessment. 
Technologies should be on a path to achieve TRL 7.  System detailed design activity 
is nearing completion.  Material specifications have been approved and materials are 
available to meet the planned pilot line build schedule.  Manufacturing processes and 
procedures have been demonstrated in a production representative environment.
6 Capability to produce a 
prototype system or subsystem 
in a production relevant 
environment
This MRL is associated with readiness for a Milestone B decision to initiate an 
acquisition program by entering into the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) Phase of acquisition. Technologies should have matured to at 
least TRL 6. It is normally seen as the level of manufacturing readiness that denotes 
acceptance of a preliminary system design.
5 Capability to produce 
prototype relevant 
environment components in a 
production
This level of maturity is typical of the mid-point in the Technology Development 
Phase of acquisition, or in the case of key technologies, near the mid-point of an 
Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) project. Technologies should have 
matured to at least TRL 5. The industrial base has been assessed to identify potential 
manufacturing sources.
4 Capability to produce the 
technology in a laboratory 
environment
This level of maturity is typical of the mid-point in the Technology Development 
Phase of acquisition, or in the case of key technologies, near the mid-point of an 
Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) project. Technologies should have 
matured to at least TRL 5. The industrial base has been assessed to identify potential 
manufacturing sources.
3 Manufacturing Proof of 
Concept Developed
This level begins the validation of the manufacturing concepts through analytical or 
laboratory experiments.  This level of readiness is typical of technologies in Applied 
Research and Advanced Development. Materials and/or processes have been 
characterized for manufacturability and availability but further evaluation and 
demonstration is required. Experimental hardware models have been developed in a 
laboratory environment that may possess limited functionality.
2 Manufacturing Concepts 
Identified
This level is characterized by describing the application of new manufacturing 
concepts. Applied research translates basic research into solutions for broadly defined 
military needs. Typically this level of readiness includes identification, paper studies 
and analysis of material and process approaches. An understanding of manufacturing 
feasibility and risk is emerging.
1 Basic Manufacturing 
Implications Identified
This is the lowest level of manufacturing readiness. The focus is to address 
manufacturing shortfalls and opportunities needed to achieve program objectives.  
Basic research (i.e., funded by budget activity) begins in the form of studies.
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Evaluating Leading Indicators 
Leading indicators can be analyzed both individually and collectively. Figure 5 illustrates how 
requirements growth might be monitored over time. As with EVM, a common program 
management practice described in some detail in Section II, an actual value (in this case, the 
number of requirements) is mapped along a planned value (the number of planned requirements). 
In this example, program management took corrective action in April in order to reduce 
requirements growth in response to a significant deviation from the planned value. Many of the 
indicators described above can be mapped out in a similar manner. We noted in Section II that, 
from a historical standpoint, EVM did not appear to significantly reduce the magnitude or 
frequency of cost overruns within DoD programs. This, we contend, has more to do with the 
quality of the information and the way the information is interpreted than with the technique 
itself (i.e., measuring an actual value against a planned value). Indeed, it is possible that EVM 
has been prone to abuse precisely because the technique itself is logically unassailable. 
Unscrupulous program personnel and managers unduly motivated by their career aspirations find 
it relatively easy to disguise problematic program data within the confines of a supposedly tried 
and true program management paradigm. !
The leading indicators that we have proposed are less prone to manipulation in that they are 
discrete values that can be objectively measured. Unlike “work performed” (the typical EVM 
metric), the number of requirements, technical readiness levels, years of management 




Figure 5. Requirements Growth Trends Leading Indicator (Rhodes, Valerdi, & Roedler, 2009) 
Of course, there is always the danger that the leading indicators might be measured poorly or 
reported too late to be of use, but we contend that various safeguards can be put in place to 
prevent problems of this sort. For example, program managers might simply mandate that certain 
indicators be monitored and reported on a near-continuous basis. Further, under the leading 
indicators framework, there is explicit recognition that the indicators are designed to highlight 
deviations from planned values before these deviations become serious problems. The pressure 
to keep programs in the green—a common objective under EVM—is less of an issue. There is no 
motivation to hide problematic values, because the values are indicative of potential problems, 
not actual ones.  
It is also possible to aggregate leading indicators to determine a given program’s “score,” which 
might be helpful to gauge overall programmatic risk. Because the relative importance of a given 
indicator will likely vary across programs, each could be weighted prior to the launch of the 
program. The indicators could then be assessed and summed for an overall score at various 
points in time.  
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The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is but one technique that could be used. Using a simple 
ordinal scale (assigning each criterion a 1, 2, 3, etc. to designate importance) allows one to rank 
different criteria but reveals nothing about how much more important one criterion is relative 
another. AHP, however, allows users to compare incommensurable elements (in this case, 
requirements volatility, leadership, technical maturity, etc. to the success of the program) in a 
rational and consistent way. Program management, along with various stakeholders, would 
decompose each of the chosen indicators into a hierarchy of more specific sub-indicators, each of 
which would then be analyzed independently, allowing meaningful numerical values to be 
calculated for each of the indicators. By using AHP in this way, program managers would have a 
better understanding of the relative importance of the chosen indicators. They might choose to 
use this information to define thresholds for each indicator. For instance, if AHP assigns 
requirements growth a low score, then the threshold might be set relatively high; that is, the 
actual value might be allowed to diverge significantly from the planned value before corrective 
action is taken and before warnings are sent up the chain of command.  
Of course, program management must be cautious when subjective assessments are converted 
into scores. Additionally, while AHP and other weighting schemes allow program personnel, 
contractors, and other stakeholders to discuss and measure what were once diverse, 
incommensurable values in a rational way, the overall program score may nevertheless disguise 
problematic values. Indicators may interact in ways that are difficult to predict and there is no 
reason to think that a relatively important indicator’s solid performance can compensate for a 
less important indicator’s failure to remain on target. Thus, it is important to stress the 
importance of analyzing leading indicators both individually and collectively so as to avoid 




The success of large projects is often assessed in terms of schedule, cost, and quality—the so-
called iron triangle. We have identified several predictive measures for use by program managers 
to ensure that programs operate within budget and schedule constraints. However, it is important 
to note that a project that “fails” in any (or all) of these three categories may go on to deliver 
large benefits to users, contractors, program personnel, and/or other stakeholders, especially as 
time passes. Conversely, projects that meet established requirements, and are completed on time 
and under budget, may fail to meet the expectations of stakeholders. Turner and Zolin (2012) 
pointed to large civilian projects, including the Sydney Opera House, which were “substantially 
late and overspent but were later perceived to be very successful” (p. 87). It is not hard to find 
“successful failures” of this sort among DoD programs.  
Take, for example, the F-111 Aardvark (“F-111”) program, begun in the 1960s. The F-111 was a 
multipurpose tactical fighter-bomber capable of supersonic speeds. Although their needs differed 
considerably, Secretary McNamara insisted that the Navy and Air Force work together to 
develop joint requirements to the extent possible, believing that this strategy would substantially 
reduce acquisition costs. However, because the aircraft made use of numerous unprecedented 
technologies (e.g., variable sweep-wing, which pivoted back for high-speed flight and pivoted 
forward for a short takeoff and landing, and a crew compartment, which, in the event of an 
emergency, would serve as an escape module for the two-man crew), accurate cost estimates 
were difficult to calculate.  
More problematic still, the DoD pursued concurrent development and production of the F-111. 
In other words, the DoD guaranteed that the selected contractor would be paid to both develop 
and produce the aircraft, which, it has been argued, served as a disincentive to efficient 
development. In any case, costs increased quickly. Despite its controversial origins and costly 
procurement, the F-111 turned out to be one of the most effective all-weather interdiction 
aircrafts ever built. At the time, no other aircraft in the Air Force could carry out the F-111’s 
mission, which included precise, long-distance air strikes in all-weather conditions. 
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The challenge, then, revolves around how the DoD should define and measure program success. 
Even if leading indicators are used narrowly to help predict program “performance” (i.e., how 
the program rates in terms of quality, cost, and schedule), with the understanding that success is 
more difficult to define, there is the possibility that needed programs will be in danger of 
cancelation. Had leading indicators been implemented in the 1960s, the F-111 may never have 
gotten off the ground. The underlying point is that success is often achieved in an environment 
that permits some degree of failure. And failures, in turn, occur in an environment that 
encourages moderate risk-taking.  
Accordingly, programs that undertake the use of leading indicators also must consider the 
strategic importance of the program. In some instances, programs should take on higher levels of 
risk and be willing to accept moderate increases in schedule and cost. Unfortunately, such a 
suggestion rings hollow in an environment where most programs regularly exceed their budgets 
and schedules. 
Weapons system cost growth can be attributed to a litany of different factors, including over-
optimism, estimating errors, unrecognized technical issues, and schedule changes. Public 
opinion, however, is less forgiving. A major poll by the Center for Public Integrity and the 
Stimson Center revealed that 80 percent of Americans believe that there is “a lot of waste” in the 
defense budget (Mehta, 2012, p. 1). Another recent poll by Reuters and Ipsos revealed that the 
majority of Americans prefer cutting defense spending to reduce the federal deficit, as opposed 
to taking money from public retirement and health programs (Smith, 2011). Justified or not, 
current defense spending is still at a high level and, in light of current budgetary conditions, is 
likely unsustainable.  
Today, the military is often unable to acquire weapons systems in the intended quantities because 
of program cost growth. The DoD has reduced its orders of F-22s and F-35s by hundreds of 
aircraft. Reductions of this sort will lead some to believe that our military is underprepared to 
face threats to our national security or, perhaps, that the need for the specified capability was 
exaggerated to begin with. Given the current polling data, it appears that many are likely to 
believe that the need was exaggerated, which increases perceptions of waste and ineptitude and, 
in turn, exerts greater downward pressure on the defense budget. Sooner or later, this sequence of 
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events will leave our military without the adequate resources to counter serious threats. The DoD 
must improve program cost control so that the services can acquire sufficient quantities of 
essential systems, improving public opinion and enabling our men and women in uniform to 
successfully carry out their missions. Implementing leading indicators across defense programs 
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